The UK Government’s Troubled Families Programme: Delivering Social Justice? by Crossley, Stephen
Social Inclusion (ISSN: 2183–2803)
2018, Volume 6, Issue 3, Pages 301–309
DOI: 10.17645/si.v6i3.1514
Article
The UK Government’s Troubled Families Programme: Delivering
Social Justice?
Stephen Crossley
Department of Social Work, Education and CommunityWellbeing, Northumbria University, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 8ST,
UK; E-Mail: stephen.crossley@northumbria.ac.uk
Submitted: 31 March 2018 | Accepted: 10 July 2018 | Published: 28 September 2018
Abstract
This article examines and reviews the evidence surrounding the UK Government’s Troubled Families Programme (TFP), a
flagship social policy launched in 2011, following riots in towns and cities across England. The programme aims to work
with over 500,000 ‘troubled families’ by 2020, using a ‘whole family’ intervention. It has been beset by controversy and
criticism since its inception, but it has been described by the government as ‘promoting social justice’. Drawing on Nancy
Fraser’s work around recognition and redistribution, this article assesses the subjective aims and achievements of the TFP
and locates this analysis in the wider objective conditions experienced by disadvantaged families in the UK at the cur-
rent time.
Keywords
austerity; disadvantaged families; family intervention; government aid; poverty; social justice; troubled families
Issue
This article is part of the issue “Vulnerable and Disadvantaged Groups: On the Margins of the Welfare State?”, edited by
Inger Lise Skog Hansen and Tone Fløtten (Fafo Institute for Labour and Social Research, Norway).
© 2018 by the author; licensee Cogitatio (Lisbon, Portugal). This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribu-
tion 4.0 International License (CC BY).
1. Introduction
The UK Government’s Troubled Families Programme
(TFP) is a UK government programme that seeks to work
with some of the most putatively ‘troubled’ families in
England.1 Established in the aftermath of riots in towns
and cities across England in 2011, the programme, now
in its second phase, advocates an intensive ‘family inter-
vention’ model to help ‘turn around’ the lives of ‘trou-
bled families’ in the first phase, and help them to make
‘significant and sustained progress’, in the second phase.
The ‘persistent, assertive and challenging’ family inter-
vention approach is intended to replace multiple, un-
coordinated interventions by specialist services, which
work with individual family members but allegedly fail
to see the family ‘as a whole’. The TFP remains one of
only two family programmes that receive funding from
the UK government (Department for Communities and
Local Government [DCLG], 2017, p. 1).
The programme, officially launched in December
2011, was one of the most high-profile social policies of
the coalition government formed between the Conserva-
tive and Liberal Democrat parties following the 2010Gen-
eral Election in the UK. Work to support ‘individuals and
families living profoundly troubled lives marked bymulti-
ple disadvantages’ was placed at the centre of the coali-
tions’ Social Justice Strategy (SJS). The strategy argues
that ‘the family is the first and most important building
block in a child’s life and any government serious about
delivering Social Justicemust seek to strengthen families’
(HM Government, 2012, p. 15). The SJS also states that
‘troubled families’:
Are families whose lives are blighted by crime,
worklessness, drug and alcohol dependency, low aspi-
rations and educational failure. The chaotic lifestyles
these families lead, without routines or boundaries,
often destroy the life chances of the children who
grow up in them.
1 The programme does not operate in the devolved administrations of Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland.
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According to the SJS, the government would attempt to
‘halt the cycle of inter-generational disadvantage that
can be seen in some families…where no-one is working
orwhere there is a history of inter-generational workless-
ness’ (HM Government, 2012, p. 43). Social justice, ac-
cording to the government strategy, is variously ‘about
making society function better—providing the support
and tools to help turn lives around’ and ‘about ensuring
everybody can put a foot on the [social mobility] ladder’
(HM Government, 2012, p. 4).
The most recent annual report on the TFP states that
the programme is ‘promoting social justice’ (Ministry of
Housing, Communities and Local Government [MHCLG],
2018, pp. 29–39) and notes that:
The Troubled Families Programme supports the gov-
ernment’s wider efforts to promote social justice and
has committed to increase the contribution the pro-
grammemakes to tackling worklessness, whilst reduc-
ing parental conflict and problem debt.
The section on ‘promoting social justice’ once again fails
to provide an adequate definition of what the govern-
ment means by ‘social justice’, and focuses primarily on
‘worklessness’, ‘parental conflict and problem debt’ and
‘health’. It includes examples and case studies of how lo-
cal services are supporting families in these areas. In one
paragraph (MHCLG, 2018, p. 34), workers helping fam-
ilies to apply for bankruptcy and to access food banks
are examples of the programme’s role in promoting of
social justice:
Forty-six percent of keyworkers provide support to
families at least weekly around debts andmoney. Key-
workers are also able to help by supporting families
in prioritising bills and clearing debts, applying for
bankruptcy, applying for welfare benefits and attend-
ing relevant meetings, or accessing food banks.
There have been a number of publications critiquing dif-
ferent aspects of the TFP since it was established (see, for
example, Bond-Taylor, 2015; Crossley, 2016, 2018; Hay-
den & Jenkins, 2014; Lambert & Crossley, 2017; Wen-
ham, 2017). The coalition government’s problematic lack
of engagementwith ‘traditional’ theories of social justice
has also been noted elsewhere (Crossley, 2017), but, to
date, there has been no critical examination of the spe-
cific governmental claim that the TFP is ‘promoting so-
cial justice’.
Wolff (2008, p. 18) has suggested that John Rawls’
Theory of Justice indicates that the justness of any given
society should be judged by its treatment of its worst-
off and most marginalised members. Rawls’ work on dis-
tributive justice is perhaps themostwell-known example
of the redistribution paradigm of social justice, which fo-
cuses primarily on the distribution of resources, assets
and economic inequalities. Rawls (1999, p. 6) argues that
‘the primary subject of justice is the basic structure of so-
ciety, or more exactly, the way in which the major social
institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and
determine the division of advantages from social cooper-
ation’. He also argues that the positions that people are
born into have undeniable and far-reaching implications
for the rest of their lives.
His work has been critiqued for a lack of engagement
with issues around recognition and, more latterly, repre-
sentation (Fraser & Honneth, 2003). Fraser’s work on the
injustice that occurs when individuals and groups, are de-
nied equal social and political standing, aside from issues
of distributive justice, is particularly useful when consid-
ering the government ‘labelling’ of a group of families
who, have been held ‘responsible for a large proportion
of the problems in society’ (Cameron, 2011a) by a Prime
Minister, and who have been portrayed as ‘the worst
families’ (Hellen, 2014) by Louise Casey, a former senior
civil servant. The label of ‘troubled families’ emerged
at a time when austerity measures and welfare reforms
were portrayed as supporting ‘hardworking families’ and
other ‘taxpayers’, thus creating ‘a class of devalued per-
sons…impeded from participating on a par with others in
social life’ (Fraser & Honneth, 2003, p. 30). Fraser argues
that when:
Institutionalized patterns of cultural value constitute
some actors as inferior, excluded, wholly other, or
simply indivisible, hence as less than full partners in
social interaction, then we should speak of misrecog-
nition and status subordination. (Fraser & Honneth,
2003, p. 29, original emphasis)
In Fraser’s terms, ‘justice requires social arrangements
that permit all (adult) members of society to interact
with one another as peers’ (Fraser & Honneth, 2003,
p. 36). For this level of participatory parity to be achieved,
Fraser states that the distribution of material resources
should ensure that individuals are not prevented from
participation by economic or material hardship, depriva-
tion or exploitation. It is also necessary for institutions
and institutionalized practices to treat all potential partic-
ipants as equals and not subordinate parties or ‘Others’
(Lister, 2004, pp. 100–103). Fraser referred to these two
requirements as the objective and intersubjective condi-
tions required for participatory parity.
Constraints of space prevent a fuller discussion of so-
cial justice theories (and critiques of them), but this arti-
cle, then, uses Fraser’s theory of social justice to examine
the TFP and the extent to which it can be said to deliver-
ing or promoting social justice. At a time of widespread
structural reform in the UK, it is appropriate to interro-
gate to what, if any, extent, a key government policy that
is central to this restructuring (Crossley, 2016) addresses
issues of misrecognition and distributive injustice. The
next section provides a fuller introduction to the TFP, be-
fore the attention turns to the empirical evidence sur-
rounding the potential of intensive work with disadvan-
taged families in the UK to improve the intersubjective
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conditions of social justice. A discussion of the effects of
austerity policies, welfare reforms and cuts to local ser-
vices on disadvantaged families examines the role of the
UK government in providing the objective conditions for
social justice. A concluding discussion suggests that sub-
stantial work is required on both fronts if the intersubjec-
tive and objective conditions for marginalised and disad-
vantaged families are to improve, let alone for participa-
tory parity to be achieved.
2. The Troubled Families Programme
In August 2011, riots took place in towns and cities
across England, sparked by the police killing ofMark Dug-
gan in Tottenham, London on 4 August. By 15 August,
more than 3000 people had been arrested, with more
than 1000 criminal charges issued in relation to the ri-
ots. Politicians and journalists were quick to blame an
alleged criminal and amoral ‘underclass’ for the riots,
even whilst the disturbances were ongoing and before
any independent inquiry had been established. David
Cameron, the then Prime Minister, stated that the ri-
ots were not sparked by concerns about racist and dis-
criminatory policing and nor were they related to the
programme of austerity measures undertaken by the
coalition or the increasing levels of inequality in the UK.
Instead, Cameron (2011b) argued that the riots were
about behaviour, people showing indifference to right
and wrong, people with a twisted moral code, people
with a complete absence of self-restraint. They were
about people with a twisted moral code.
Eschewing possible social, structural and economic
explanations for the involvement of thousands of people
in the riots, Cameron (2011b) instead focused on the role
of parenting, arguing that it was necessary only to ‘join
the dots’ to get ‘a clear idea about why…young people
were behaving so terribly’:
Either there was no one at home, they didn’t much
care or they’d lost control. Families matter. I don’t
doubt that many of the rioters out last week have
no father at home. Perhaps they come from one of
the neighbourhoods where it’s standard for children
to have a mum and not a dad, where it’s normal for
young men to grow up without a male role model,
looking to the streets for their father figures, filled up
with rage and anger. So, if we want to have any hope
of mending our broken society, family and parenting
is where we’ve got to start.
Cameron promised to put ‘rocket boosters’ under at-
tempts to work with the ‘problem’ or ‘troubled fami-
lies’ ‘that everyone in their neighbourhood knows and
often avoids’. Four months later, a new government pro-
gramme was announced which aimed to ‘change com-
pletely the way government interacts with [‘troubled
families’]; the way the state intervenes in their lives’
(Cameron, 2011a). At the launch of the programme,
Cameron (2011a) stated that he wanted to be clear what
he meant by ‘troubled families’:
Officialdom might call them ‘families with multiple
disadvantages’. Some in the press might call them
‘neighbours from hell’. Whatever you call them, we’ve
known for years that a relatively small number of fam-
ilies are the source of a large proportion of the prob-
lems in society. Drug addiction. Alcohol abuse. Crime.
A culture of disruption and irresponsibility that cas-
cades through generations.
‘Troubled families’ thus became the latest iteration of
the ‘underclass’ thesis that has been a recurrent feature
of British society since at least Victorian times (Welsh-
man, 2013). At various times, for example, there have
been concerns about a ‘social residuum’ (Himmelfarb,
1984), ‘problem families’ (Starkey, 2000), ‘transmitted
deprivation’ (Welshman, 2012), ‘the underclass’ (Mac-
nicol, 1987, 1999) and the ‘socially excluded’ (Levitas,
1998). The TFP became merely the most recent UK gov-
ernment attempt to control and change the behaviour of
the ‘undeserving poor’. It set out to work with and ‘turn
around’ the lives of 120,000 ‘troubled families’ by the
end of the coalition government’s term of office in May
2015. ‘Troubled families’ were initially defined as: those
that were involved in crime and/or anti-social behaviour
(ASB); with children excluded from school or with low at-
tendance, with an adult on out-of-work benefits or; who
cause ‘high costs to the taxpayer’ (DCLG, 2012, p. 9).
The TFP was to be based on a model of ‘family in-
tervention’ that involves a single key worker who can
resolve longstanding issues through a ‘persistent, as-
sertive and challenging’ (DLCG, 2012, p. 6) approach and
through greater co-ordination of existing services:
Family intervention workers are dedicated to the fam-
ilies and provide an antidote to the fragmented ac-
tivity from many different agencies that usually sur-
rounds a troubled family. They ‘grip’ the family, their
problems and the surrounding agencies and are seen
to be standing alongside the families, their difficulties
and the process being put in place, which can lead to
new approaches to dealing with long standing prob-
lems. (DCLG, 2012, p. 18)
The programme was established on a Payment-by-
Results (PbR) basis which would see local authorities re-
ceiving some initial funding when they started working
with ‘troubled families’ in their area and further funding
when certain behaviour criteria had been met. A reduc-
tion in crime and/or ASB and improvements in school at-
tendance, or an adult moving into ‘continuous employ-
ment and off out-of-work benefits’ could trigger a PbR
claim (but not both). The government claimed that such
families had had their lives ‘turned around’ by the TFP.
Other issues which might have been affecting the fam-
ily, such as poverty, poor housing, ill health, substance
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misuse, domestic violence etc., were not recognised by
the PbR system and were not taken into account in the
government’s presumption of a family’s life having been
‘turned around’.
A year into the programme, the ‘massive expansion’
of the TFP was announced. 400,000more ‘troubled fami-
lies’ were identified, using different criteriawhich now in-
cluded domestic violence, ill health and ‘children in need’.
These new families would be worked with under a sec-
ond phase of the programme, running from 2015–2020.
The language of ‘turning around’ the lives of ‘troubled
families’ was dropped and local authorities were now ex-
pected to be able to demonstrate families making ‘sig-
nificant and sustained progress’ in order to trigger a
PbR claim.
In June 2015, the government claimed that it had suc-
cessfully ‘turned around’ the lives of 99% of the ‘trou-
bled families’ that local authorities had worked with un-
der the programme. The claims of near perfect success
were immediately called into question (Crossley, 2015)
and reports emerged that the independent evaluation of
the TFP had been ‘suppressed’ (Cook, 2016) because it
was unable to find any discernible impact attributable to
the programme. Since these early controversies, the pro-
gramme has operated with a much lower public profile
in its second phase.
3. The Misrecognition of ‘Troubled Families’
The TFP has been subjected to numerous critiques since
its inception. At the launch of the programme, the gov-
ernment misused research which showed the number of
families experiencing multiple disadvantages in the mid-
2000s as ‘evidence’ of 120,000 ‘troubled families’ who
were the ‘source of a large proportion of the problems
in society’ (Cameron, 2011a). Levitas (2012, p. 5) noted
that because the 120,000 figure was taken from a sur-
vey carried out with a very small number of families ‘any-
one with any statistical sophistication will recognise it
as spuriously accurate’. Levitas then turned to the label
‘troubled families’ which, she argued, ‘discursively col-
lapses “families with troubles” and “troublesome fam-
ilies”, while simultaneously implying that they are dys-
functional as families’—a ‘discursive strategy [that] is
successful in feeding vindictive attitudes to the poor’
(Levitas, 2012, p. 8). She suggested that the original re-
search was not the problem, but the representation of it
by the government was problematic and misleading:
If we interrogate the research behind the imputed ex-
istence of 120,000 troubled families, this turns out to
be a factoid—something that takes the form of a fact,
but is not. It is used to support policies that in no way
follow from the research on which the figure is based.
The problem is not the research itself, but its misuse.
The misuse or misrepresentation of research has contin-
ued throughout the development of the TFP. A survey
which enabled Louise Casey to make the case for rad-
ical reform of public services turned out to have been
invented (Crossley, 2018, pp. 150–151). ‘Dipstick infor-
mation gathering’, undertaken without any ethical pro-
cedures being followed, was published in an official gov-
ernment document and was promoted by Casey giving
numerous interviews to national newspapers (Ramesh,
2012). Data which highlighted that the majority of the
‘troubled families’ worked with in the early stages of
the first phase of the programme were not involved
with significant amounts of crime or antisocial behaviour
was reported as proving that they were ‘the worst fam-
ilies’ (Hellen, 2014) with greater problems than orig-
inally anticipated. A Parliamentary Enquiry concluded
that the DCLG had been ‘evasive’ in addressing their
queries about the delayed publication of the evaluation,
and that ‘these delays and obfuscation have given a
bad impression about the Department’s willingness to
be open’ (House of Commons Committee of Public Ac-
counts, 2016, p. 5).
The government eventually published the evalua-
tion of the first phase of the programme in October
2016. There were a number of different streams to the
evaluation, including a family survey, ‘family monitoring
data’, families’ experiences and outcomes, and an im-
pact study. Much of the press coverage that followed
the publication of the evaluation focused on the find-
ings from the national impact study, and one paragraph
in particular:
The key finding is that across a wide range of out-
comes, covering the key headline objectives of the
programme—employment, benefit receipt, school atten-
dance, safeguarding and child welfare—we were unable
to find consistent evidence that the TFP had any signif-
icant or systematic impact. That is to say, our analysis
found no impact on these outcomes attributable to the
programme. The vast majority of impact estimates were
statistically insignificant, with a very small number of pos-
itive or negative results. These results are consistentwith
those found by the separate and independent impact
analysis using survey data, which also found no signifi-
cant or systemic impact on outcomes related to employ-
ment, job seeking, school attendance, or ASB. This gives
us further confidence in the reliability of our results (Be-
wley, George, Rienzo, & Portes, 2016, p. 20).
This focus on one aspect of the evaluationmeant that
other aspects of it did not receive as much scrutiny as
they arguably deserved. The Family Monitoring Data re-
port showed that the clear majority of ‘troubled families’
that local authorities worked with weren’t actually that
troublesome or anti-social (see also Crossley, 2015). The
Family Survey Data report (Purdon & Bryson, 2016) col-
lected data from the families themselves, and provided
support to the national impact study findings that no im-
pact could be attributable to the programme. The report,
based on responses from 495 families who had been on
the programme for ninemonths and a comparison group
of 314 families who had just started on the programme,
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was unable to find any impact attributable from the pro-
gramme, based on responses from families:
We found very little evidence that the Troubled Fam-
ilies Programme significantly affected the outcomes
of families around nine months after starting the pro-
gramme. The statistically significant improvements
we did identify relate to the perceptions of main carer
respondents in the Troubled Families group about
how they were coping financially, and more gener-
ally about how they felt they were faring, and their
expectations for the future. There were no positive
(or negative) impacts identified for housing, employ-
ment and jobseeking, anti-social behaviour and crime,
school behaviour and attendance, health, drug or al-
cohol use, family dynamics or well-being. (Purdon &
Bryson, 2016, p. 24)
The government reported that the programme had
‘turned around’ 99% of the ‘troubled families’ it set out
to work with. The evaluation did not report if any fam-
ilies interviewed or surveyed thought that their lives
had been ‘turned around’ by their involvement in the
TFP. At the same time, families’ household income levels
and/or the extent of any material deprivation were not
formerly assessed or reported on during the first phase
of the programme.
The TFP was not the only government policy target-
ing disadvantaged families. When David Cameron was
Prime Minister he made several speeches about the im-
portance of families, claiming that they are ‘the build-
ing blocks of a strong, cohesive society’ (Cameron, 2010)
and that ‘whatever the social issue we want to grasp—
the answer should always begin with family’ (Cameron,
2014). In a speech on improving children’s life chances,
Cameron (2016) claimed that ‘families are the best anti-
poverty measure ever invented…[t]hey are a welfare, ed-
ucation and counselling system all wrapped up into one’.
In the coalition government’s first child poverty strat-
egy (HM Government, 2011), Sure Start children’s cen-
tres were re-positioned as being services that ‘targeted’
the ‘most disadvantaged families’. The same document
linked the recruitment of an extra 4,200 health visitors
to other work focusing on the ‘most disadvantaged fami-
lies’, or those with ‘multiple problems’ (HMGovernment,
2011, p. 4). The introduction of the Family Nurse Partner-
ship (FNP) in 2007 was designed to support young moth-
ers and pregnantwomen in their parenting through a pro-
gramme of intensive home visits. Building on a model
imported from the United States, it offered a ‘psycho-
educational approach and a focus on positive behaviour
change’ (Family Nurse Partnership [FNP], n.d.). The FNP
website alludes to the ‘underclass’ thesis (Welshman,
2013) stating that it is a ‘preventive programme [that] has
the potential to transform the life chances of the most
disadvantaged children and families in our society, help-
ing to improve social mobility and break the cycle of inter-
generational disadvantage’ (FNP, n.d., emphasis added).
There are parallels between the FNP and the TFP,
most notably the emphasis on intensive work carried
out during frequent visits to the family home, and a fo-
cus on mothers over other family members. The official
evaluation of the FNP found that the programme was
‘no more effective than routinely available healthcare’
in improving any of the primary outcomes of the pro-
gramme, which included reducing smoking in pregnancy,
increasing birth weight and reducing rates of emergency
attendance or hospital admission for any reason (Robling,
2015, p. 10). The researchers concluded that there was
‘little advantage’ to be gained from adding the FNP to ex-
isting service provision for young mothers.
According to the first TFP annual report, the TFP and
the FNP are the ‘only two family programmes with ma-
jor funding from central government’ (DCLG, 2017, p. 1).
Unfortunately, there is no substantial independent evi-
dence that either programme is meeting its stated aims.
This should not, however, be particularly surprising. Poli-
cies and programmeswhich locate the source of families’
problems within the home, or ‘the family’ whilst ignor-
ing the wider social, political and cultural determinants
of family life are unlikely to be able to affect significant
change across families experiencing a wide range of dis-
advantages. Different approaches, or foci, of such pro-
grammes fail to adequately interrogate the sources of
many of the problems faced by disadvantaged families.
The TFP, the family intervention model it is based on,
and other forms of recent state intervention in the lives
of families experiencing ‘troubles’ or ‘multiple disadvan-
tages’ are not, however, designed to address structural
issues or distributive injustices such as poverty and in-
equality. The ‘orgy of family-blaming’ (Gillies & Edwards,
2012, p. 432) that followed the riots in 2011 and the pri-
mary focus on ‘interventions’ in family life to address a
range of ‘social problems’ leaves no room for the empow-
erment of marginalised families, or even the treatment
of them as equals. The programme, and others like it, is
based on the misrecognition of the origins of poor fami-
lies’ problems and challenges, and does not afford them
participatory parity of any kind.
4. Redistribution Policies for Disadvantaged Families
At the same time that the UK government was claiming
it had ‘turned around’ the lives of 120,000 of the most
‘troubled families’ in England, and thus addressing the in-
tersubjective conditions required for participatory parity,
it was also embarking on one of the biggest programmes
of ‘welfare reform’ ever seen in the UK. Both of the par-
ties that formed the coalition government agreed on the
need for austerity measures to help the UK economy
to recover following the banking crises of 2007–2008.
The defining feature of their political programme was
the insistence on the need to reduce public spending.
The result was a plan which would see the UK ‘have
the lowest share of public spending among major cap-
italist economies, including the USA’ with ‘the welfare
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state…under the most severe and sustained attack it has
faced’ (Taylor-Gooby, 2013).
The ‘ideological re-working’ of austerity (Clarke &
Newman, 2012, p. 300), from a temporary but neces-
sary economic response to a financial crisis to a long-
term political response to an allegedly bloated and over-
generous welfare state, saw intense public scrutiny fall
upon people claiming out-of-work benefits. Labels such
as ‘shirkers’, ‘skivers’ and ‘troubled families’ were used
to justify cuts in public spending and other structural ad-
justments to the welfare state, and also served to deflect
attention away frommalpractice andmismanagement in
the financial sector.
The early stages of the coalition government saw a
number of changes and ‘reforms’ to the financial support
offered by the state to disadvantaged groups. Some ben-
efits, such as Child Benefit, and some elements of tax
credits, were frozen for three years while others were
limited to increases of just 1% for certain periods of time.
A ‘benefit cap’ was introduced in 2013, and then reduced
in 2016, limiting the total amount of benefits that any sin-
gle household could claim. A spare room subsidy, popu-
larly known as the ‘bedroom tax’ was also introduced for
social housing tenants who were deemed to be ‘under-
occupying’ their property. Some benefits, such as the
Employment Maintenance Allowance and the Health in
Pregnancy Grant, were cut completely. The campaign-
ing charity Child Poverty Action Group estimated that a
baby born in April 2011 would have been around £1500
worse off than one born in April 2010 as a result of
the early Coalition government welfare reforms (CPAG,
2011). The eligibility criteria for disability and incapacity
benefits have been made more restrictive and some el-
ements made time-limited and means tested (De Agos-
tini, Hills, & Sutherland, 2014, p. 11). In October 2016, an
inquiry conducted by the United Nations Committee on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD) into the
impact of welfare reforms on disabled people concluded
that there was reliable evidence that ‘the threshold of
grave or systematic violations of the rights of persons
with disabilities’ had been met (United Nations Commit-
tee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities [UNCRPD],
2016, p. 20).
Welfare reforms have thus disproportionately im-
pacted on poor families with children, with disabled fam-
ilies also being adversely affected in comparison with
other groups. Themost recent set of official child poverty
figures released by the UK government showed that
more than 100,000 extra children were living in poverty
in the UK compared to the previous year. It is the third
consecutive year-on-year increase and the percentage of
children living in poverty is predicted to increase from
29.7% to 36.6% in 2021–2022, according to analysis un-
dertaken by the Institute for Fiscal Studies (Hood & Wa-
ters, 2017, p. 15). Foodbank usage in the UK has in-
creased dramatically in the years since the coalition gov-
ernment took office, and many people that use food-
banks do so because of benefit changes and delays
(Garthwaite, 2016; Loopstra & Lalor, 2017). The rolling
out of Universal Credit, the government’s flagship social
policy reform, is estimated to strip away £5.5 billion of
benefit entitlements from poorer households (Hood &
Waters, 2017, p. 23). Analysts have argued that transi-
tioning toUniversal Credit will involve ‘significant income
losses’ (Hood&Waters, 2017, p. 15) for poor households
with three or more children as a result of the limiting of
the child element of universal credit to two children.
In addition to these ‘reforms’ which have seen some
benefits withdrawn entirely, the levels of others reduced,
and new assessment procedures and changes to eligi-
bility criteria, there has been a significant increase in
the numbers of people penalised and sanctioned for not
meeting certain conditions attached to unemployment
and ‘job-seeking’ related benefits. Potential sanctions
have traditionally played a limited role in the administra-
tion of social security benefits but, in recent years, the
rate and severity of sanctions has increased substantially.
In a series of publications and briefings drawing on his-
torical documents and DWP statistics David Webster has
highlighted these changes. Webster (2015) has referred
to the sanctions as ‘an amateurish, secret penal system
which is more severe than the mainstream judicial sys-
tem, but lacks its safeguards’. He documented that more
people were sanctioned through the benefits system
than received fines through the criminal justice and court
system (Webster, 2015). He also highlighted that ‘sanc-
tioned benefit claimants are treated much worse than
those fined in the courts’ (Webster, 2015) and points
out that sanctions are generally applied to poor people
and they tend to result in almost total loss of benefit in-
come for a period of at least two weeks, despite a sys-
tem of ‘hardship payments’. Webster suggests that sanc-
tions push people off benefits, but not necessarily into
employment of any kind, least of all good quality, and
secure work. He goes on to expound some of the other
consequences of sanctions:
Sanctions undermine physical and mental health,
cause hardship for family and friends, damage rela-
tionships, create homelessness and drive people to
Food Banks and payday lenders, and to crime. They
also often make it harder to look for work. Taking
these negatives into account, they cannot be justified.
At the same time that sanctions have been preventing
people from claiming the benefits they are legitimately
entitled to, the increasing stigmatisation surrounding
benefits claimants and the continuing complexity of the
system means that many people do not claim the bene-
fits that they are entitled to receive. Research around the
increased stigmatisation associated with claiming bene-
fits reported that ‘quantitative and qualitative evidence
suggests that stigma is playing a role in explaining non-
take-up of benefits and tax credits’ with around 25% of
respondents to a survey highlighting stigma as a reason
for delaying or not claiming benefits (Baumberg, Bell, &
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Gaffney, 2012, p. 3). Official government statistics (which
the ‘troubled families’ turned around figures are not) sug-
gest that around 40% of people entitled to JSA do not
claim the benefit (DWP, 2017, p. 1). In total, the gov-
ernment estimated that over £12 billion of benefits re-
mained unclaimed in 2015–2016. Thus, the stigmatisa-
tion and misrecognition of people in receipt of benefits
as ‘scroungers’ and ‘skivers’ adds to and strengthens the
distributive injustices they experience.
A number of reports by academics and independent
researchers have highlighted the regressive nature of
many of the welfare reforms undertaken since 2010
(Beatty & Fothergill, 2013, 2016; De Agostini et al., 2014;
Portes & Reed, 2018) and the impact of cuts to local
government and the reduction is services that they of-
fer (Hastings, Bailey, Bramley, Gannon, &Watkins, 2015).
Economic geographers noted that ‘83 per cent of the
loss from the post-2015 reforms—£10.7bn a year by
2020–21—can be expected to fall on families with de-
pendent children’ (Beatty & Fothergill, 2016, p. 3). More
recently, a report for the Equality and Human Rights
Commission has demonstrated that ‘the largest impacts
are felt by those with lower incomes’ (Portes & Reed,
2018, p. 15). The analysis also noted that ‘the changes
have a disproportionately negative impact on several
protected groups, including disabled people, certain eth-
nic groups, and women’ and that ‘lone parents in the
bottom quintile (bottom fifth) of the household income
distribution lose around 25 per cent of their net income,
or one pound in every four, on average’ (Portes & Reed,
2018, p. 15).
Given the analysis and statistics outlined above, it is
difficult to construct an argument that the government is
improving the objective conditions for ‘troubled families’
to be treated as equals and for issues of social injustice
to be addressed. The government’s welfare reforms have
disproportionately affected disadvantaged groups, lead-
ing to larger numbers of children living in poverty and
more people needing to rely on emergency food pack-
ages provided by foodbanks. It is poor families with chil-
dren, the supposed ‘beneficiaries’ of the TFP, that have
been hit hardest by these reforms.
5. Conclusion
Fraser was clear that social justice could not be achieved
through redistribution or recognition alone. Instead, she
proposed ‘a “perspectival dualist” analysis that casts
the two categories as co-fundamental and mutually irre-
ducible dimensions of justice’ (Fraser & Honneth, 2003,
p. 3). Examination of the effects of the TFP and simi-
lar policies being pursued in the UK at the current time
highlight how the conditions of redistribution and recog-
nition are linked. Poor and disadvantaged families ex-
periencing material deprivation and economic hardship
have been portrayed as criminal, anti-social and a burden
on the ‘taxpayer’. They have frequently been contrasted
to more respectable ‘hard-working families’. When fam-
ilies’ resources become so low or precarious that they
have to access food banks, they experience the stigma
and shame that is attached to relying on donations of
food from strangers at a time when people who are el-
igible for out-of-work or disabled benefits are portrayed
as ‘scroungers’ and ‘benefits cheats’ by sections of the
media and some politicians (Garthwaite, 2016).
Many families experience challenges or troubles that
they require support with. Some disadvantaged fami-
lies experience more problems than others, often at the
same time, and for varying periods of time. In such cases,
it is absolutely right that the state provides support to
such families. These families do not need to be given an
official label like ‘troubled families’, and nor do they need
to be linked to a wide range of disparate social problems.
The support available to such families does not need to
be couched as a targeted ‘persistent, assertive and chal-
lenging’ intervention, and nor does it need to portray
families as the architects of their own circumstances. As
Lister (1996, p. 11) noted when discussing Charles Mur-
ray’s writing on the ‘underclass’, ‘the use of stigmatis-
ing labels is likely to lead to stigmatising policies’, and
the same is certainly true of the TFP. Support available
to families experiencing multiple ‘troubles’ should come
through universal programmes and in the form of an ad-
equate income. It is perfectly possible to provide sup-
portive services (as opposed to ‘intensive interventions’)
to families as and when they need them and in a non-
stigmatising way, at the same time as ensuring they have
an adequate income which prevents them from being
excluded from services, customs and patterns of activi-
ties that others take for granted. Delivering socially just
support to marginalised families cannot be a case of ei-
ther/or, as Fraser points out. It was not that long ago in
the UK that Sure Start centres were being opened at the
same time that tax credits and benefits for families with
children were being extended (although problematic tar-
geted policies co-existed alongside more universal provi-
sion even then). All that is required for a similar situation
to (re)emerge is the political imagination and will to im-
plement such services and policies.
The TFP, then, despite grand claims about having
‘turned around’ the lives of ‘troubled families’, helping
many more make ‘significant and sustained progress’,
and of ‘promoting social justice’, is found wanting when
it is examinedusing Fraser’s two-dimensional conception
of social justice. In the UK at the current time, the gov-
ernment appears to be extending injustice, through the
misrecognition of the source of ‘troubled families’, and
the inequitable distribution of the effects of its auster-
ity policies.
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